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The tension between individual freedom and collective
security has been and always will be difficult to resolve.' Quite
appropriately, this discussion forum focuses on the threat that
increasingly sophisticated technology can pose to individual
privacy. However, I would like to provide the "yin to the yang" and
point out the obvious: technology itself is not the culprit, because
it is a double-edged sword, a tool that can be used to protect as
well as invade privacy. We need not endorse the single-minded
approach of WikiLeaks to recognize the benefits that occur when
technology discloses government cover-ups or simply provides
accurate information where none previously existed.
I. STREET ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS
An example of how both the government and individual
citizens could benefit from increased use of technology is reflected
in an ongoing debate being waged in the editorial pages of the
New York Times. Several diametrically opposed op-ed pieces were
prompted by the New York City Police Department's release of
statistics regarding stop-and-frisk 2 incidents within New York
* University of Richmond.
1 The issues raised under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 'bring
into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order versus liberty in the democratic state."
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13 (1966).
2 In America, "stop and frisk" is legal shorthand for encounters between police and
citizens where the citizen may be stopped, interrogated, and patted down for weapons.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
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City. One opinion piece entitled The Shame of New York referred
to these statistics as establishing the city's "degrading, unlawful
and outright racist stop-and-frisk policies."3 It noted that "[b]lacks
were nine times more likely than whites to be stopped by the
police, but no more likely than whites to be arrested as a result of
the stops." 4
A counter-opinion piece in the same newspaper was entitled
Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are.5 This title invokes the
famous line from Willie Sutton, the successor to Bonnie and Clyde
in bank robbing folklore. Sutton would rob a bank, the police
would catch him and put him in prison, Sutton would escape, rob
another bank, and the cycle would repeat itself. This was the age
when the FBI was just beginning to compile profiles of career
criminals. The FBI asked Sutton: "Why do you rob banks?" His
answer was, "[B]ecause that's where the money is." The modern
variation on this theme asserts that the police are conducting stop
and frisk operations in ethnic neighborhoods because that's where
the crime is.6 "Based on reports filed by victims, blacks committed
[sixty-six percent] of all violent crime in New York in 2009,
including [eighty percent] of shootings and [seventy-one percent]
of robberies."7
The editorials in the New York Times reacted to the same
statistical report on stop and frisk practices by putting two very
different spins on the raw data. These contrasting views are
possible and perhaps unavoidable because the statistical
summaries do not reveal what those underlying street encounters
between police and citizens actually looked like. One possible way
to get beyond the mere statistics is to focus on the kind of concrete
See Bob Herbert, The Shame of New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at A23
(discussing New York's unlawful and racist stop-and-frisk policy); Charles M. Blow,
Escape from New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A23 (discussing "the hyper-
aggressive police tactics that have resulted in a concerted and directed campaign of
harassment against the black citizens of this city").
See Herbert, supra note 3.
See Heather MacDonald, Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2010, at A19 (stating that allegations of racial bias ignore how much crime
influences police department operations).
6 See id. ("Such stops happen more frequently in minority neighborhoods because





facts that are becoming more readily available in our
technologically advancing society. Modern technology may enable
us to accurately record police-citizen encounters unfiltered by
traditional post-hoc reconstructions of the events.
At present, a court reviews a challenged stop and frisk by
listening to witnesses testify as to their memory of what occurred.
Most often the available witnesses are limited to the citizen who
was stopped and the police officer that initiated the stop. Their
testimony, like all testimony, has weaknesses ranging from
outright perjury to less blatant "slanting" of facts to make them
more favorable to the party with a stake in the proceedings.8
Because the police and the citizen have very different stakes in
how a court will perceive their encounter, it is not surprising that
they relate very different accounts of what transpired. Aside from
this tendency to consciously or unconsciously shape the facts,
what is particularly troublesome about reconstructing police-
citizen encounters is that such encounters are very stressful for all
participants. The citizen often feels threatened and harassed,
while the police officer often suspects that a crime is about to
occur and the suspect is armed and dangerous.9 This type of
stressful situation is hardly conducive to detached and objective
reporting of what actually occurred.
Separating the true facts from biased and faulty
reconstructions of those facts is further complicated by the very
real tendency of all of us, including police officers, to react
instinctively to threatening and stressful situations. Our rational
8 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently cautioned:
We also note our concern about the inclination of the Government toward
using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent, as indicia of
suspicious activity. ... [An officer and the Government must do more than
simply label a behavior as 'suspicious' to make it so. . . . [W]e find it
particularly disingenuous of the Government to attempt to portray these arm
movements as ominous. . . . Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the way in
which the Government attempts to spin these largely mundane acts into a
web of deception. . . . [T]he Government cannot rely upon post hoc
rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to turn up contraband.
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2011).
9 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (permitting a police officer
to execute a search for weapons where the officer reasonably believes that his safety or
that of others is in danger).
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justifications for those reactions often come only after the crisis
has passed, and those justifications rarely capture the need for
rapid action in a stress-filled environment. Thus, when an officer
is asked why he confronted a particular person, the honest answer
may be: "There was no smoking gun, but something was not right
about this guy and this whole situation. I could not stand by and
just ignore a potentially dangerous condition." While police may
admit to fellow officers that they acted on their instincts,' 0 they
have been taught that they must provide a more rational
explanation to a judge." It is hardly surprising that police tend to
fall back on familiar language that the courts have accepted in
prior cases12-Such as a police report that the suspect made
"furtive gestures"; the encounter occurred in a "high crime area";
or the locale was a well-known "open-air drug market." On the
other side, the citizen challenging the stop and frisk will often
invoke terminology-describing encounters that courts had
previously condemned-for example, "I was a victim of racial
profiling." When all of these factors are combined-an emotionally
stressful situation, each participant's distinct stake in the
outcome, and the tendency of both parties to invoke conclusory
legal terms rather than purely factual descriptions-the court is
not likely to get a completely accurate picture of the disputed
incident.
The solution to the multiple weaknesses of the current
approach may lie in bypassing a witness's memory and credibility
by invoking the cry of sports commentators-"Let's go to the
tapes." In America, the National Football League uses instant
to I know it when I see it' has a bad reputation in legal circles, but the reputation
is undeserved. Sometimes, consider-all-the-circumstances standards work tolerably
well in spite of their linguistic muddiness-for all the muddiness, bottom lines may be
reasonably predictable." William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE
L.J. 2137, 2175 (2002).
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (1968) ("[1In justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.... Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court
has consistently refused to sanction.").
12 Craig S. Lerner, Judging Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 25 (2007) ("The
legal system in practice rewards those officers who are able and willing to spin their
behavior in a way that satisfies judges . . . .").
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replay to monitor an official's judgment; on a world-wide basis, the
professional tennis circuit uses "shot spot" to review a close call by
a linesman. In similar fashion, courts can and should use
videotapes to review a police officer's judgment to impose an
encounter on an unwilling citizen. Video-photography has become
so commonplace that, even if none of the suspects or bystanders
on the street had a cell phone camera handy, we could require
police officers walking city streets to be equipped with a camera to
record all they see and do. Such cameras are becoming standard
equipment on police squad cars, and the images they record
frequently turn up on YouTube. Perhaps the most famous video of
a confrontational clash between police and citizen is the video in
the Hiibel'3 case, where the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a
scenario involving a police officer demanding identification from a
motorist that insistently refused to provide it.14
The video in Hiibel was available for judicial review because
cameras in police squad cars have become fairly standard
equipment. It is only a small step forward to recognize that
technology is at the point where we can equip officers on the beat
with miniature video cameras in their badge or on their shoulder.
It is not just James Bond or Batman who can have all those
wonderful gadgets. With a video record of what actually took place
out there on the street, a court is no longer totally dependent on
the citizen testifying one way about the facts and the police
testifying the other way.
II. INTERROGATION
In addition to recording street encounters between police and
citizens, videos of police interrogation of suspects can be, and have
1 See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (finding that the
arrest of a Terry stop suspect for refusal to identify himself, in violation of Nevada law,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and that defendant's conviction for refusal to identify himself did not violate
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
14 See id. at 181, 188 (stating that a Nevada statute requiring identification is
reasonable after balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights
against the legitimate government interest); see also Felix Tam, Encounter Between
Larry Hiibel and Nevada Highway Patrol, YOUTUBE (May 2, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-APynGWWqD8Y (showing a Nevada Highway Patrol
officer encountering a rancher and arresting him because he refuses to cooperate).
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proven in the past to be, devastating evidence when they are
produced in court. When the U.S. Supreme Court began reviewing
police interrogation practices in the 1950s and 1960s, one
troubling aspect for the Court was its inability to reconstruct
exactly what happened in an isolated interrogation room where
the suspect had been cut off from all contact with the outside
world. Even more so than street encounters, which may be
observed by bystanders, only the suspect and the police could offer
their version of what transpired during an interrogation inside the
police station. In the years leading up to the Miranda decision,
much of the defense bar urged the Supreme Court to ban police-
dominated interrogations and permit the police to question
suspects only in the presence of a lawyer or magistrate.' 5 When
the Court crafted the Miranda6 decision, it continued to permit
unsupervised interrogations but cautioned that because the police
were responsible for creating the isolated interrogation, the
burden rightly fell on them to offer some objective evidence of a
crucial aspect of the interrogationl 7-i.e., that the suspect had
been properly warned of his constitutional rights and made a
voluntary decision to waive those rights and submit to
interrogation. For decades, the objective evidence usually
consisted of a written Miranda waiver form signed by the
defendant. Today, these forms are increasingly being replaced by
videos of the entire interrogation.' 8 The videos, unlike the written
waiver forms, disclose not only what was said, but also the
manner in which the Miranda warnings were delivered.
15 The A.C.L.U.'s amicus brief in Miranda proposed that only "the presence of
counsel in custodial interrogation" would provide adequate protection to an arrested
person. RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
EXERCISES 481 (West 4th ed. 2009).
16 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (finding that statements
obtained from defendants during "incommunicado interrogation . . . in a police-
dominated atmosphere . . . without full warnings of constitutional rights" are
inadmissible as a violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination).
17 Id. at 475 ("Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of
making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.").
1s Some states require the police to electronically record interrogations. Richard A.
Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the
Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 528 (2006).
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When I discuss the Miranda decision with my law students, I
point out statistics indicating the confession rate has not declined
in the years following Miranda. Students often look incredulous
and ask, "Why would anyone confess after being given the
Miranda warnings?" The answer can lie in form over substance
because of the varied manner in which those Miranda warnings
are delivered. Suppose the police dispassionately and carefully
explain:
You have the right to remain silent, what you say can be used
against you, so are you sure that you want to talk to us? And
you can have a lawyer free of charge. Are you sure you do not
want to talk to a lawyer before answering our questions?
If the warnings were given in this fashion there might well be
a significant drop in the number of voluntary confessions given by
suspects. But that is not the way Miranda warnings are typically
given in the real world. Many police grudgingly comply with the
letter of the law by giving the warnings in a rapid-fire, staccato
form, with run-on sentences that sound something like this:
You have the right to remain silent anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law you have the right to
an attorney if you cannot afford one, one will be appointed for
you, why did you do the crime?' 9
When I suggest this kind of delivery to my students, they
sometimes wonder if I am exaggerating to make an academic
point. I then bring the "real world" into the classroom by playing
an actual video of officers giving "rapid-fire" Miranda warnings to
a suspect in Richmond, Virginia. When that tape was played in
the courtroom, the judge viewing it asked: "Is [the officer]
speaking in tongues?"20 So, "going to the tape" and objectively
19 A run-on sentence which combines the Miranda warnings with immediate
questioning-"Why did you do it?"-is possible because the Supreme Court has moved
from its initial requirement that the police obtain a waiver, to its current approach of
placing the burden on the suspect to cut off questioning by invoking his right to silence
or to a lawyer. See generally, Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda's Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L.
REV. 535 (2012).
20 See Commonwealth v. Benjamin, 507 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("The
manner in which the detective read the statement to [the defendant] was so
2013] 827
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viewing the actual interrogation that took place eliminates the
weaknesses inherent in attempts of police and suspects to verbally
reconstruct the scenario. Again, technology itself is neutral
because the same recording that reveals how the police conducted
the interrogation will also disclose how the suspect behaved.
Certainly the most famous videotapes of interrogations were
the 2002 interrogations of two men believed to be top al Qaeda
operatives-Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri-at a
clandestine CIA prison in Thailand. 21 The men were detained on
suspicion of conspiracy in the September 11, 2001 attacks and
other terrorist activities. They were subjected to "enhanced
interrogation" tactics, including waterboarding (simulated
drowning).22 In determining whether or not the waterboarding
techniques used constituted torture, 23 the videotapes would have
been the best evidence. However, the videotapes were destroyed
before the courts could examine them, and there were no
prosecutions of the interrogators or the officials who destroyed the
tapes. 24
In contrast to the missing record of "enhanced interrogation"
techniques, videos and photographs played a major role in
bringing criminal charges against the prison guards at Abu
Ghraib. When visual evidence of their abuse of prisoners surfaced,
both officers and enlisted personnel were officially reprimanded,
court martialed, and dishonorably discharged from the military.25
unintelligible that it was functionally equivalent to not reading to [the defendant] the
Miranda rights.").
21 See Times Topics: Abu Zubaydah, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/z/abu-zubaydah/index.html?
8qa (last updated Apr. 20, 2009); Times Topics: Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/nlabd-alrahimal-nashirilin
dex.html?8qa (last updated Oct. 25, 2012).
22 Id.
23 The Bush Administration maintained that the enhanced interrogation
techniques were not torture, but after World War II, the United States and its allies
prosecuted some Japanese soldiers for torture involving simulated drowning. Id.
24 The former head of the CIA's clandestine service, Jose Rodriguez, admitted that
he authorized the destruction of ninety-two interrogation tapes. He defends that
decision and the use of the enhanced interrogation methods in his recent memoir. See
JOSE A. RODRIGUEZ JR., HARD MEASURES: How AGGRESSIVE CIA ACTIONS AFTER 9/11
SAVED AMERICAN LIVES (2012).
25 For example, Colonel Thomas Pappas was relieved of his command and received
a General Memorandum of Reprimand that effectively ended his military career. See
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Watching the watchers brought the culprits to justice and, just as
importantly, should have a strong deterrent effect on potential
government misconduct. Certainly one would expect that in the
future, prison guards will think twice about abusing prisoners
when the guards realize that their abuse might eventually turn up
on television and on the front pages of the world's newspapers.
III. USING TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT PRIVACY
As earlier noted, individual freedom and government efforts
to promote collective security often conflict. However, there are at
least some instances when technology can further both interests.
For example, technology can enhance government efforts to
protect against security threats, while simultaneously lessening
the intrusion upon individual rights. Just a few months ago, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders,26 holding that strip searches of arrestees to be placed
in the general population of a detention facility are constitutional
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the arrestees
possess either weapons or contraband. 27 Apparently, the Supreme
Court felt compelled to make an all-or-nothing choice and thus
concluded that keeping prisons secure from the introduction of
weapons and drugs outweighed an individual's privacy rights.28
Abu Ghraib US Colonel Reprimanded, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2005, 3:59 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/4539033.stm.
Specialist Charles Graner was found guilty of conspiracy to maltreat detainees,
failing to protect detainees from abuse, cruelty, and maltreatment, as well as charges
of assault, indecency, adultery, and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to ten
years in prison, dishonorable discharge, and reduction in rank to private. See Graner
Gets 10 years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, MSNBC (Jan. 16, 2005, 8:34:42 AM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6795956/ns/worl-news-mideast-n-safrica/t/graner-gets-
years-abu-ghraib-abuse.
Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick pled guilty to conspiracy, dereliction of duty,
maltreatment of detainees, assault, and committing an indecent act in exchange for
other charges being dropped. He was sentenced to eight years in prison, forfeiture of
pay, and a dishonorable discharge. See Soldier Gets 10 Years for Abu Graib Prison
Abuse, ARMY NEWS SERV. (Jan. 19, 2005),
http://web.archive.org/web/20050916090659/http://www4.army.millocpalprint.php?story
id -key-'6764.
26 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
27 Id. at 1523.
28 Id. at 1520-23.
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An all-or-nothing choice between prison security and
personal privacy might not have been necessary if the Court had
been willing to examine the type of surveillance technology used to
screen passengers at airports. Instead, the Court distained
consideration of modern technology while sanctioning primitive
methods of carrying out security searches at prison facilities. The
dissent in Florence pointed out how extensive-if not extreme-
those searches are as described in a prison manual detailing how
to conduct such searches:
[A] visual inspection of the inmate's naked body. This should
include the inmate opening his mouth and moving his tongue
up and down and from side to side, removing any dentures,
running his hands through his hair, allowing his ears to be
visually examined, lifting his arms to expose his arm pits,
lifting his feet to examine the sole, spreading and/or lifting his
testicles to expose the area behind them and bending over
and/or spreading the cheeks of his buttocks to expose his
anus. For females, the procedures are similar except females
must in addition, squat to expose the vagina. 29
This extensive sacrifice of individual privacy and dignity is
particularly troubling because these extreme measures protect
against a threat that may be minimal. A study of 23,000 persons
admitted to the Orange County correctional facility between 1999
and 2003 reported that "[o]f these 23,000 persons . . . [police]
encountered three incidents of drugs recovered from an inmate's
anal cavity and two incidents of drugs falling from an inmate's
underwear during the course of a strip search."30 This translates
into a .0001% success rate achieved at the expense of humiliating
23,000 people.
The trade-off between individual privacy and institutional
security might be better resolved by utilizing technology that
adequately serves the government's purpose with less intrusion
upon individual rights. For example, in place of a physical
examination of body cavities, metal detectors, specifically the
Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS) chair, could be used to
29 Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 1528.
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identify metal hidden within the body. 3' Combine such technology
with highly reliable drug sniffing dogs, and protection against
both weapons and drugs can be achieved without the need for
dehumanizing body cavity searches.
CONCLUSION
We can no more stop the advance of technology than we can
stem the ocean's rising tide. We can, however, pick our battles.
Courts can be asked to ban or limit the most egregious
technological threats to personal privacy.32 In the same manner
that legislation commonly prohibits arming police helicopters, an
aroused electorate can legislate against excessive surveillance
such as banning an all-seeing air force of drones. Lastly, we can
seek out opportunities for using technology to enhance individual
rights. The same aerial drone that records a citizen's private
conduct may also disclose a rogue cop's racist encounter with
minority citizens. In the end, utilizing technology to watch the
watchers may be the best revenge.
31 Id.
32 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that police cannot,
without judicial approval, place a GPS device on a citizen's automobile).
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